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DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOS? **
ABSTRACT
The article presents an analysis of the role of demos in power relations in 
democratic states. The author of the text postulates the need for contemporary 
political science research to expand its analyses beyond formal structures of 
political institutions and include in its scope also features of demos – the 
“cultural factor” to better understand the functioning and chances for success 
of democracy in different states. 
Keywords: democracy, political science research, axiology, demos 
When in 1999 in Kraków I organised for the International Political 
Science Association (IPSA) a round table discussion, the question that 
I dared ask the participants and which, as was my intention, was meant 
to be the main topic of the discussion, was the following: “is the model 
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seq.).
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of the Western, liberal-capitalist democracy, replicable on a global scale?” 
(See Pałecki, 1999, p. 11)
This question was justified for at least two reasons. First of all, at that 
time the international political science community was engaged in a debate 
on the transitions towards democracy by the countries of the then dis-
mantling “Soviet Bloc”1. Clearly, at that time there was still no knowledge 
as what kind of democracies would emerge once the system transition 
is completed (cf. Brzeziński, 1990, p. 259 et seq.). Secondly, at that time 
the “globalization discourse”, whose participants were racing with each 
other in making the prognoses of the consequences of the fast progress-
ing standardization of areas such as culture but also political systems, 
was in full swing; Zygmunt Bauman for example wrote: ”Globalization 
is on everyone’s lips” (Bauman, 1998, p. 5). And yet, as it turned out, my 
question did not get the participants’ attention. Instead, the discussions 
focused on the collapse of communism and the “globalization processes” 
(See also Lowi, 1999, p. 88 et seq.). that were, naturally, clearly linked to it. 
However, today, when I reflect on why this was the case and why during 
the subsequent IPSA World Congresses this topic did not return, I come 
to an unavoidable and very important, from the perspective of this paper, 
conclusion that the causes for that state of affairs were not scientific but 
rather situational. 
However, had research been undertaken at that time, it would have 
been diagnosed that at least some of the societies which were then freeing 
themselves from the communist system could face some “internal” dif-
ficulties while introducing and consolidating capitalist liberal democracy. 
Out of necessity, an undesired gradation of their capacities in this regard 
would have been developed, which would not be in juxtaposition with the 
policy of support expressed by Western European countries and the United 
States in regards to the system transformation that was then taking place in 
Central and Eastern Europe and which could weaken the undisputable and 
1 Fracis Fukujama was then announcing the global triumph of liberal democracy 
calling it the “end of history” (see Fukujama 1996; also Heywood, 2009, p. 218; Brzeziński, 
1990, p. 263 et seq.; in newer literature Wróbel, 2002, p. 17 et seq.). 
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much needed enthusiasm of these societies during the ground-breaking 
period of the “peaceful revolutions”. 
Social problems do not disappear solely because such is the will of 
the politicians, nor because they are absent in the “politically correct” 
research. Thus, I was not particularly surprised when in the January 2014 
issue of the Journal of Democracy the problem that I wanted to discuss 
in the late 1990s returned like a boomerang. This time the discussion, 
titled “Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm”, was led by Marc F. Plattner 
and participated by such thinkers as; Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, 
Donald L. Horowitz and Thomas Carothers. It would be difficult to find 
a more competent group of experts indeed. An adequate summary of 
this discussion is expressed in the conclusion formulated by Horowitz 
who stated that the concept of the transition paradigm is still of a certain 
utility even though, as the scholar also pointed out, some caution needs to 
be applied since there are differences between countries. For this reason, 
in his view, adhering to universal patterns of democracy by all may be of 
little use. Horowitz also warned the international actors (that is influential 
participants of international relations – noted by K.P.) against using stand-
ardized practices which apparently were to help in the transition processes 
in different parts of the world. Fukuyama also expressed his concern as 
whether the process of consolidating democracy could ever take place, 
considering the now observable phenomenon which he referred to as 
“rolling back” of the principles of liberal democracy in many countries 
which not that long ago underwent the process of system transformation2.
A more general conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion and 
which more directly refers to the question formulated in the introduc-
tion to this text, can be formulated in the following way: the political 
axiology and the doctrine of capitalist liberal democracy, the so-called 
Western democracy, both aspiring to become universal, have become, in 
today’s international order, even more unrealistic – if not completely 
utopian – than that was the case in the 1990s. It, thus, becomes quite clear 
that together with this generalised axiology and a rather foggy doctrine 
2 For the summary of this discussion see: Network of Democracy Institutes: 
ndri@ned.org.
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which are losing their validity, the research on democracy has to undergo 
a significant change. Otherwise, it will become a futile effort of limited 
cognitive value. Possibly, the time has now come for a reflection over the 
subject of such reformed research.
Let us start with the title of this article. It contains an explicit contradic-
tion; democracy without demos is not a democracy. Plain and simple. 
Hence, an explanation is in order. First of all, the phrase “without demos” 
means in this case “without demos” in the mainstream political science 
research which aspires to formulate theories (explanatory generalizations). 
In other words, research activities that focus on voting preferences or 
social attitudes in regards to a certain ideology or political program are 
not focused on demos. By stating this I do not intend, by any means, to 
underestimate the practical value of these kinds of research activities. 
Secondly, the phrase “without demos” as used in this title also means 
without such demos that would meet, at a satisfactory level, its norma-
tively determined characteristics – what it should be like, what we wish it 
would be like in Poland and worldwide, as a guarantee of the continuation 
of our democratization process. 
The term “democracy” should also be explained. For the author of 
this article “democracy” is a “continuously ongoing process”. It refers to 
something that is in the “making” and not something that has been formed 
once and forever, a standard phenomenon; it is a “process of democratiza-
tion” with a target that is completely unachievable (avec tout conditions 
fixe) as it is solely desirable, being an ideal construction in a specific ideol-
ogy. It is the principal value – a goal, which does not require justification. 
“Democracy” and “democratization process” (for short: “democratization”) 
are the terms that are used in this text interchangeably. 
Such a statement also requires further explanation. First of all, the 
already mentioned political axiology and the doctrine both refer to a politi-
cal system that is based on five principles, which assumedly are to allow 
the implementation of the principal value – complete democracy. These 
principles include: competitive free-market economy, political liberalism, 
“rule of law” (which means that, among other things, there are guarantees 
of an equal treatment by law as well as observance of civil rights and 
liberties and universal human rights), lack of discrimination in elections 
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of political representatives, decision-makers elected by popular vote with 
term limits and guaranteed sovereignty of their political decisions. An 
exhaustive explanation of these quite obvious principles clearly expands 
the subject matter of this article as well as the competence of its readers. 
Let us then trust this competence and move on to the next issue. 
“Capitalist, liberal democracy” (“Western democracy”), which is based 
on the above mentioned principles, also constitutes, until today, the above-
mentioned “principal value”, one whose reaching and protection do not 
require – as it has been noted already – justification. It is a value “in itself ” 
for all those who accept democracy as the best possible political system 
when it comes to meeting the needs of all contemporary societies organ-
ized in state structures (cf. i.e. Held, 1987, part II and III; Sartori, 1994, 
especially p. 525 et seq.). 
The term “transition” that has also been mentioned in the introduction 
to this text refers to a characteristic way of implementation of system 
transformation that is aimed at the implementation of a democratic sys-
tem. It is a process of a relatively peaceful nature and rather consensual, 
although – what should also be pointed out – it is ideologically quite 
radical and assumes a gradual “consolidation of democracy”, meaning the 
ordered preservation of the democratic system as well as the optimization 
of application of its above mentioned principles. 
Next, the phrase “today’s reality” is used to refer to a contemporary 
international (inter-state) situation which, when compared with the “opti-
mistic” 1990s, has undergone numerous, and significant as well as multi-
aspect changes, which again need not be explained in great detail here. 
Should anyone, however, want to make a reference to adequate literature, 
the source that is worth recommending in this regard is “Liquid Moder-
nity” by Zygmunt Bauman (2006). This work is key to understanding social 
and global processes that have created ground for the “political order” of 
the new 21st century to emerge. The order that, more than anything else, 
is seen by many as submerged in a constant, as if immune to any cure, 
crisis of democracy (cf. Krastev, 2013). What should also be noted is the 
fact that as opposed to the rather successful “transitions” in the Central 
and Eastern European states of the former Soviet Bloc that took place in 
the 1990s, the later attempts at democratization undertaken in countries 
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such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and a few African countries, especially those 
where the “Islamic revolution” took place, and in some countries of the Far 
East, but also continental China, experienced and still continues to experi-
ence a certain degree of failure. This fact makes the thesis that democracy 
cannot be, and will not be, a global system highly probable. It is not the 
goal of the rather, out of necessity, short cut reflections presented in this 
article to seek and analyse the causes for such a state of affairs. Instead, 
and in relation to the leading problem of the “lack of demos”, two hypoth-
eses could be formulated and followed by adequate reflections. The main 
hypothesis suggests that the observed failures of the democratisation 
process are a consequence – at least in an equal if not decisive degree – of 
the lack of adequate competence on the part of demos in the relations of 
political power of a given state, and not only – as a great share of politi-
cal research suggests – of the mistakes and institutional deformations, 
meaning the ways of organizing and implementing the political system. 
Thus, the first and the main cause of all “weaknesses of democracy” lies 
each time in the specific characteristics of a given “cultural factor”, which 
here is limited to the state of the political awareness and popular political 
attitudes of a given society which is organized in a state structure. Put it 
simply, this awareness and attitudes are the established “common” convic-
tions and dispositions of people who are “involved”, actively or passively, 
in political processes (which are syndromic with economic and social 
phenomena) taking place in their state and its international surround-
ings. These deeply internationalized, commonly accepted and taken for 
granted, meaning unquestioned, values as well as the state of knowledge 
about life that characterise this society, cause difficulties, or even make it 
impossible, for demos to fulfil its obligations in the relations of political 
power.3 Undoubtedly, social awareness, when it is adequately shaped and 
internalized in a relatively stable way, can change the category of “those 
who are governed” into demos and make it one of the most important 
allies of democratization. This hypothesis should be supplemented by 
3 The ”cultural factor” is hence a collection of factors intentionally limited here to 
the so-called “non-material culture” (for more on material and non-material culture see 
i.e. Kroeber, 2009, p. 282 et seq.). 
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another, more general, hypothesis, namely: political power institutions 
of a state, even when elected in the most democratic way – which in 
the previous stages of transition took place very rarely – and even when 
functioning in accordance with the democratic rules of government, 
never have their own, autonomic and initiating impact potential that is 
sufficient for generating independent, common and stable democratic 
social relations. What is more, when they are alienated from their social 
context, meaning they are deprived of demos, these institutions are quick 
and easy to succumb to an autocratic deviation. That is why all attempts 
at democratization which aim at introducing instant political institutions 
from abroad are doomed to a quick and unconditional failure. 
If we try to increase – to some degree – the probability the above 
presented hypotheses, it is worth pointing a certain striking cognitive 
weakness in the democracy research which makes it difficult (if not impos-
sible?) to better recognize the reasons as to why the dream of the many 
political leaders to spread capitalist and liberal democracy worldwide has 
no chances of coming true. 
This weakness refers to a surprising one-sidedness of political science 
research in regards to democracy. The lack of adequacy of this research 
in regards to a range of phenomena that are clearly one of its subject 
matters and the shortage of expected explanatory as well as pragmatic 
outcomes which it would deliver become most obvious when we agree 
with quite a commonplace statement that democracy is a way wielding 
political power which is based on the principle of a two-sided, normative 
and substantial dependency of both parties of power relations: power 
institutions, meaning “those who govern” and citizens, meaning “those 
who are governed”. Giovanni Sartori explains this phenomenon in the fol-
lowing way: “In the final calculation politics is dependent on the relations 
between those who govern and those who are governed. It was believed, 
however, that this dichotomy existed in all political systems with the 
exception of democracy, but the fact that the democratic decision-making 
process blurs the line dividing those who govern from those who are 
governed does not mean that there is no such line” (Sartori, 1994, p. 115, 
also p. 46 passim). Let us add to these observations that the essence of this 
dependence between “those who govern” and “those who are governed” 
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in a democratic system, or in other words; between institutions of politi-
cal power and demos, lies in the rule of their democratic co-operation, 
which when breached inevitably changes democracy into some sort of 
an autocratic regime (despotism, dictatorship, absolutism, but also, for 
example, ochlocracy). “Those who are governed” in a democratic state 
cannot be, therefore, treated as subjects who are deprived of their rights. 
They should be seen as partners of those who govern to a degree that is 
relevant in the making of, the content of, and the way of implementing 
the political decisions. What is more, they should be partners who form 
the category of “those who govern” into adequate institutions (system) 
and legitimize their power entitlements. Hence, democracy cannot be 
reduced solely to institutional forms, such as a parliament elected by 
a popular vote, or a responsible government, or a law-abiding public 
administration and law enforcement, or an independent judiciary, etc. 
Democracy requires the existence of a true democratic society, a society 
that is able to perform in power relations the role of a real (not only 
formal) partner. The most noble, even respecting the popularly accepted 
norms and values and effectively governing, rulers do not make the power 
relation a democratic one until they do not turn those “who are governed” 
into their partners as it is them without whom “those who govern” cannot 
implement their “power” in a “democratic” way. 
As simple and trivial it could sound the so-called “good government” 
is not a necessary marker of democracy. It gets that chance only when 
it co-governs with demos. Nothing works better for the effectiveness 
of the decision made by the political ruler than good partnership rela-
tions with those to whom these decisions are addressed. Breaching the 
partnership rule inevitably sets off the spiral of coercion and leads to 
the “democracy deficit” or even complete departure from democratic 
forms of governance. 
The most explicit example proving the adequacy of these observations 
are the problems with democratization within the European Union. Here 
we have, on the one side of the power relations, a built out, centralised 
and equipped with vast competence bureaucracy of “delegated power” 
that comes from the member states and, on the other side, an embry-
onic form of demos, meaning the European citizenship, which is limited 
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to a few rights provided by the European Council to those who enjoy 
the national citizenship of the EU member states. These rights include: 
freedom of movement and residence within the European Union, par-
ticipation in elections to European Parliament, auxiliary consular protec-
tion and possibility to file petitions with EU institutions, including the 
Ombudsman. Other things, however, such as employment or investing, 
are subject to many limitations stipulated in individual “state laws”. This 
artificially constructed demos, with its limited rights, which additionally 
are of secondary importance when it comes to the shaping of relations 
with the EU authorities (institutions) and that has not (which is also very 
important) been assigned any political obligations that would be shared 
by all “European citizens”, and which is principally incapable of directly 
legitimizing power of the majority of EU institutions, is – de facto and de 
iure – deprived of the possibility of a real implementation of partnership 
functions in regards to the ruling “Brussels autocrats”. Consequently, the 
EU, with all of its unquestionable merits, cannot brag that it has achieved 
the status of a democratic political entity (cf. Bodnar, 2004, p. 126; Brostl, 
2004, p. 19 passim, Halmai, 2004, p. 47 passim). 
Should this, as a matter of fact, little revealing truth on the partnership 
role that demos plays in a democratic system as well as its performance be 
confronted with contemporary mainstream political science research, we 
would notice that the research efforts have been headed in the opposite 
direction, namely at examining the formal structures of institutions of 
political power. It is the quality of these institutions – and the quality that 
is very differently understood – that today’s political scientists primarily 
regard as the main reason for the strength or weakness of contemporary 
democracies. Consequently, hoping that their findings are useful for prac-
tice researchers have become focused on exposing newer, apparently also 
more perfect, institutional forms, suggesting adequate system “reforms” for 
them (cf. Antoszewski, 2014, p. 381 passim). However, when we start exam-
ining “those who govern” and their practices of wielding political power 
we notice, which well justifies the above presented research tendency, that 
excessive formalization of power relations, which is also an “escape” into 
an increasing number of legal regulations and more complex procedures, 
effectively blurs in the eyes of “those who are governed” the real goals of 
180 KRZYSZTOF PAŁECKI 
“those who govern”4. I am far away from questioning the role of political 
institutions in democratization processes and refusing the proceduraliza-
tion efforts of their pragmatic justification. However, it needs to be pointed 
out that ignoring, in this way, the citizens’ partnership in the governance 
process, possibly even without awareness of its tragic consequences, ruins 
the foundation of democracy. What is even worse, “those who govern”, 
who benefit from this “ruining” by getting for themselves some executive 
facilitations, which are wrongly linked with an increase of their normative 
competence (potential power), find (without much difficulty) a comfort-
able intellectual (“scientific”, “theoretical”, “expert”) support in this “purely” 
institutional political science research. Even a glance at the topics of the 
programs of the last IPSA World Congresses convinces me that there 
is a clear qualitative lack of proportions in the focus of contemporary 
political science on the problem of the functioning of the state institu-
tions of political power5. Research into the characteristics of demos can be 
found on the margins of the explanations of negative phenomena which 
take place in political parties, and in recent years, with an increasingly 
shrinking participation in elections that has been noted for the majority 
of democratic countries in Europe as well as the US. In regards to the 
latter there are only a few more attempts to find an empirical answer to 
the question about the reasons for such a state of affairs; see for example 
research on presidential elections in the USA (Ching-Hsing Wang, 2013, 
p. 483 et seq.; Stockmer, LaMontagne, Scruggs, 2013, p. 74 et seq.). At the 
same time a different question, incomparably more important, that is the 
question about the chances of introducing a democratic system – at least 
in the form that is compatible with the requirements of capitalist liberal 
(“Western”) democracy – in countries of a strategic meaning for the fate 
of the international community – is left unsaid. Even if we gave up on the 
idea of a universal applicability of the Western democracy model, which 
seems prima facie justified (views are in this regard divided: Habermas, 
2014, p. 45, 91, et seq.), the above formulated question does not lose 
4 More about this for example in the practices of making and applying law see 
Pałecki, 2013, p. 56 et seq. 
5 See International Political Science Abstracts. Paris IPSA, AISP, 2000–2012. 
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“automatically” its justification. The only thing that finding to it a well-
documented and justified answer requires “switching” the research focus 
and theoretical reflections from political institutions to their inseparable 
partner in a democratic system, that is demos. This is the direction of the 
reflections by Leszek Kołakowski (2014, p. 201 et seq.).
Establishing any kind of methodological requirements for the kind of 
research that is being postulated here requires a more careful look at the 
concept of demos itself. This term is usually associated with the category 
of “citizens” (meaning people who have “citizenship” of a given country). 
And indeed, while it is a feature that should not be too hastily and in each 
case given up on, under certain conditions, which if not met, “citizenship” 
in itself is an indicator of a small distinction and quite weak “explanatory 
power” for explaining the processes of democratization. 
More than anything else demos cannot be associated with persons who 
hold citizenship which, in turn, is understood as an effect of a formal 
law-making activity (meeting the administrative procedures of receiving 
citizenship – which is described as “formal citizenship”). Certainly, such 
a procedure and its fulfilment are necessary conditions for citizenship, but 
from the here accepted point of view, they are quite insufficient. Let us then 
put aside a certain tradition that is held by the theoreticians of democracy 
and that simplifies the reality. Its followers like Giovani Sartori, believe 
that demos simply means all citizens (in a formal sense) who are assigned 
electoral rights and who implement them by taking part in electing politi-
cal representatives (Sartori, 1994, p. 115). In my view, belonging to demos 
requires something more. This requirement is a real socio-political agency 
of all addressees of political decisions, including of course also those 
who hold formal citizenship. Without this agency democracy inevitably 
becomes a label that is put on some form of an autocratic regime. This real 
agency (”material citizenship”) is an ability to a substantial, independently 
determined by the individual, participation in a broadly understood politi-
cal process; a participation that is guaranteed not only by law, but also 
by the creation of adequate material and organizational conditions for 
all potential participants of the political process and their using of these 
opportunities, from which the normatively allowed free-will abstinence 
significantly impedes or disables implementing political power (execut-
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ing real power) by state institutions equipped with competence for such 
performance (Pałecki, 2003, p. 215). Material citizenship should then be 
understood as an element of the already obtained formal citizenship and 
additionally such a state of awareness and attitudes as well as behaviour of 
the beneficiaries of this citizenship which point to their culturally shaped 
will and the need to participate in the political process (participation in 
their politically organized community; the state and its components, in 
“civil society” organizations), This is a necessary condition, but it is also 
not sufficient to set off the process of partnership participation in political 
power, meaning the democratization process. 
Material citizenship is, of course, a gradual qualification. From this 
perspective, we can – in a simplified way – understand democratization 
as obtaining by “formal” citizens an increasing degree of the qualities of 
“material citizens”. From a historical point of view (in the realm of the 
European culture) it should be seen as the ongoing emergent process of 
the transformation of “subjects” into citizens (formal) and later the latter 
into participants of the political process with dynamically increasing 
qualities of “material citizenship”. 
The term “political process” should be then understood as the overall 
activities undertaken by both sides of political power relations (“those who 
govern” and “those who are governed” that is demos) for the implemen-
tation of the normatively established values-goals, meaning the subject 
matter of this relationship (in an ideal model of democracy, these are the 
activities undertaken for the implementation of a program that has been 
agreed on as a result of the partnership). 
“Material citizenship” is in this approach not only a legal or formal 
qualification, but also a formal-substantial one. Or more precisely: it is 
legal-factual qualification as it includes the rights and the obligations 
which are not only established by law but also by other normative systems 
accepted by the society (of course to a degree in which they are relevant 
in regards to the relations of political power) but also because, which was 
mentioned before, it requires the meeting of the substantial (“material”) 
conditions for using these rights and applying some psycho-behavioural 
dispositions (I shall return to this topic a bit later). Let us also add that the 
above presented is an individualistic concept of citizenship (meaning one 
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that refutes a holistic concept of demos), which sees it as a political feature 
of individuals, individual people in a state, and not a qualification of their 
whole analytically constructed categories (aggregates) (Habermas, 2014., 
s. 80; see also Chodubski, 2014, p. 41 et seq.). The state itself should be seen 
as a politically organized society (not necessarily ethnically homogenous, 
meaning not always a “nation-state”) and not only as territorially and 
hierarchically organized institutions of political power (Pałecki, 2007, p. 
15). The personal nature of material citizenship does not contradict with 
the way it is used in an intermediary way: by membership in different 
civil society associations, something that is of crucial importance today. 
Clearly, the times when all citizens could have been gathered at one place 
at the same time to make a political decision (meaning creating, protec-
tion and especially distributing public goods) have probably passed with 
no chances for return. Today the question we are asking is whether the 
virtual communication technologies can soon become a substitute for the 
ancient Greek agora and whether they will enable a direct communication 
(making political decisions) by a practically unlimited number of internet 
users – citizens? As of today we do not have an answer to this question. 
Being a member of demos (in the degree determined by the quality 
of the material citizenship or, which is the same thing, by the level of 
the real political agency) is inextricably related with the feeling of some 
characteristic emotions and sharing of some knowledge which symp-
tomatically generate common views6. The latter, for example, include: 
a sense of solidarity with other citizens, a cultural or ethnic identification, 
patriotism or similar understanding of the national interest, etc. As Rob-
ert Dahl rightly pointed out the emergence and stability of democratic 
6 „Wspólnotowe przekonania” we współczesnych, funkcjonalistycznych teoriach 
socjologicznych są zazwyczaj uznawane za „imperatywy funkcjonalne”, to jest za taką 
właściwość systemu społecznego, która determinuje wszystkie procesy zachodzące w jego 
obrębie (cf. Turner, 2005, p. 38 et seq.). Współoddziaływanie stanów emotywnych i kog-
nitywnych w przekonaniach, w świadomości, każe również w tym kontekście zauważyć 
konieczną „otwartość poznawczą” uczestników procesu demokratyzacji, pozwalającą na 
uzgodnienie ze „swoją” zastaną, „oczywistą”, „własną”, „pewną” wiedzą, wiedzy innej, poz-
bawionej tych przymiotów i towarzyszącą temu zdolność do ich wzajemnego uzgodnie-
nia lub zmiany poglądów. 
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governments depends on people’s belief systems (cf. Dahl, 1986, p.49 et 
seq.). A significant degree of the above-individual compliance with the 
belief system is also a characteristic qualifying us as a part of a given 
demos, meaning towards being a real citizen of a politically engaged 
society. Let us complete this statement with the reflections presented by 
Jürgen Habermas who pointed out that democratic citizenship does not 
necessarily need to be rooted in a national identity. Instead, it requires 
socialization of all citizens in one common political culture (Habermas, 
1992, p. 23). The most desirable effect of such socialization for the process 
of democratization, which does not necessarily lead to the standardization 
of values shared by all citizens (the unification of their preferences), is an 
emergence of a general ability for axiological inclusion. This ability is 
necessary for demos to play the role of a partner in a democratic system of 
governance (“an inclusion in a political society” as it is called by Kenneth 
Baynes, while Jürgen Habermas “moves” the meeting of this condition 
to a possibility of participation in a “global society”, to “Inklusionsan-
spruche”) (Habermas, 2014, p. 42, 108 et seq.). This ability for axiological 
inclusion means introducing “new” and “foreign” values to “our own” 
already internalized values, to “our own” values that are included in our 
preference scales. This ability means including these “other” values and 
accommodating them with “our own” values, instead of their “automatic”, 
spontaneous, and deprived of any reflection, rejection when they come 
across as incompatible with our own beliefs. Rejecting of “other” values 
obviously is not forbidden either. However, it should be proceeded with 
self-reflection accompanied by a careful balancing of both negative and 
positive consequences. This ability for an axiological inclusion comes 
across as particularly valuable in the case of the so-called public issues, 
that is those with wide social consequences; as it allows for solidarity in 
action where citizens (institutions) are driven by an egalitarian principle 
of “nothing for some at the cost of others”. 
Without axiological inclusion the emergence of community-oriented 
convictions is of little probability, if possible at all. If we accept the number, 
the degree and the extent of matters of the reached agreements in regards 
to power decisions, between demos and “those who govern”, as a meas-
urement of partnership in a given political regime, then all shortages in 
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the ability for the axiological inclusion will result in the departure from 
partnership and, as a result, the democratization process. 
An emergence of a relatively common ability for axiological inclusion 
in a given society is, from the perspective of research on demos, the best 
possible indicator of the degree to which the above-mentioned “cultural 
factor” shapes in a society the characteristics that are favourable for 
democracy. Accepting that culture plays a decisive role in this process 
(which, nonetheless, should be tempered due to the achievements of the 
contemporary sciences on human somatic nervous system) we could, 
following the example of the 19th century cultural anthropologists, dif-
ferentiate between different kinds of demos, by placing them on different 
points of a certain continuum, which at the one end would have societies 
with cultures excluding axiological inclusion, meaning excluding democ-
racy (as they exclude partnership among parties to power relations as 
well as, which will be discussed in more details below, the principle of 
representation and the need for competence or civic self-limitation) and 
these that allow, or even promote, axiological inclusion, meaning create 
basic conditions for democratization. Scaling, from this perspective, of 
different societies would, of course, require new empirical research which 
would aim at establishing these “inclusive” abilities, that is qualifications 
for fulfilling the role of demos. It could then turn out, against the rules of 
the so-called political correctness, that cultures of some societies practi-
cally exclude an introduction of democracy to their political organization 
that – paraphrasing a bit the saying by Leszek Kołakowski – “democracy 
is against their nature” (2014, p. 169). 
Taking into account these remarks, the shortest qualification of demos 
could be based on the following rule: demos is all people who, in a given 
country, have a material (legal and real) citizenship. Analytically, and 
not only analytically, they could be included in specific political power 
relations, in the category of “those who are governed”. Actually, from the 
methodological point of view, research in this category would have to 
be – in an adequately balanced degree – both speculative and empirical 
and it should lead towards cataloguing of the characteristics of “those 
who are governed” and whose presence (presence in an adequately high 
degree) if not guarantees, then at least is favourable to, an introduction 
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and maintaining of a certain form of democracy in a given country (in 
a global order) (cf. Godlewski, 2014, p. 364 et seq.). A democracy that is, 
of course, acceptable in the existing environment, meaning one that is in 
accordance with the basic principles of the functioning of democratic 
regimes (societies). Determining that such characteristics are lacking in 
many societies, as well as that there is a lack of presumptions indicating 
their emergence, would lead to a negative answer no only to the question 
of what are the chances for the worldwide spreading of democracy, but 
also about the adequate changes in national and international strategies 
and political practices. 
Political science research, as it has been postulated in different sections 
of this article, clearly requires some ideal “reference platform” determined 
by a catalogue of characteristics of demos which are necessary for generat-
ing all democratic processes. Some of them have already been discussed, 
let us turn to others now. 
Let us then start with a simple statement that all modern democracies 
are “doomed” for a better or worse implementation of the representative 
system. A political process in democratic systems, meaning all activities 
undertaken in complex relations between “those who govern” (institutions 
of political power) and “those who are governed” (citizens) take place 
based on the principle of representation, which directly limits the pos-
sibility of exercising power by the whole demos (exceptionally it solely 
allows practicing direct democracy). On a side note: we can be represented 
only by our partners, while the “chiefs” always represent solely themselves, 
they represent “their own” political programs even when they dress them, 
for propaganda reasons, into “unquestionable” interests and expectations 
of “their people”. Hence, the prerequisite for any democratic system, 
even though it is not sufficient, is the citizens’ ability to: a/ formulate, 
establish and practice the commonly accepted principle of representation, 
b/ a common readiness to be subordinate to executive decisions of this 
representation, especially those that aim at electing its composition and 
the implementation of the strategy of creating, protecting and distributing 
public goods c/ such subordination to these decisions that can pass a test 
during which these agreements clash with the opposing ones, articulated 
particular interests, different components of demos (ethnic, religious, 
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professional, “interest groups” etc.). These characteristics do not exclude 
the legally accepted forms of protests. They eliminate “rebellions against 
the rule of law”, meaning the ability to find, in case of a conflict (not only 
conflict of interests, but also that of convictions, ideas, programs, etc.) 
such a compromise that in an equal (not offering any privileges) degree 
would be “costly” for the whole demos (it would be an equal burden for all 
citizens), meaning also for these groups whose only “interests” and “rights” 
are to – following the government’s decision – be fulfilled7. 
Naturally, all these “abilities” of demos are of a gradual nature, which 
suggests that the chances for democracy in some societies and in certain 
geopolitical, economic, civilizational, etc. conditions are subject to certain 
differentiation. It is also easy to notice here that they all are currently used 
by numerous voices criticizing the practicing of modern democracies. We 
do not need to make any special efforts to come to the conclusion, and 
one that is quite demolishing for different idealizations of democracy, that 
the more tolerant a society is in regards to differences in viewpoints, the 
more it is attached to the principle of freedom of expression, the more it 
is pluralistic in regards to the value system and the more favourable it is 
in regards to individualistic forms of fulfilling needs and an unlimited 
freedom of competition, which, together are seen as “virtues” of western 
democracy (cf. for example Dubiel, 2009, p. 447 et seq.; Zachariasz, 2009, 
p. 16 et seq.; and also earlier Cook, 1964, p. 177 et seq.), the more difficult 
it is to get and maintain all these abilities (characteristics) of demos that 
are “necessary” for democracy8. In other words, modern democracies 
are burdened with a difficult to overcome, if possible at all, internal con-
tradiction between the values-goals, which they declare and which they 
make their “binding axiology” (“ideology”) which they try to implement 
and the securing of necessary political conditions for their implemen-
tation, meaning a possibly stable, effective and with the widest possible 
range partnership-based co-operation with demos. The latter requires, 
7 I would adhere to this view, being at the same time fully aware, that it can be, for 
many reasons, quite controversial. Discussion over it would require a separate analysis 
(see Hayek, 1973, p. 55 et seq.). 
8 On the problem of contemporary multiculturalism which minimizes its ability for 
system stabilization see Bauman, 2011, p. 25, 65 et seq.
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in somewhat difficult to establish degree, an adequate uniformization of 
viewpoints of “those who govern” and “those who are governed” – some-
thing which always generates the fear of a possibility of a slip towards 
totalitarianism – uniformization which is not fully compatible with the 
warranties of pluralism in democracy. An apparent, and also most often 
used, remedy for this state of affairs is the limiting of the role of demos 
in power relations, hence also the obligations of demos in these relations, 
to participation in electionsł changing the demos into the “electorate”. 
The frequency of fulfilling this obligation by demos, however, also shows 
some stable and decreasing tendencies; interestingly about it wrote Bożena 
Wroniszewska, Ewa Ganowicz (2013, p. 127 et seq.). This is accompanied 
by a certain conviction, which can be fatal for democracy in the long 
term and which can be reduced to a certain colloquial statement such 
as: “let’s elect whomever and what this elected person will later do for us 
will be solely this person’s problem”. In this way, we are easily approaching 
the caricature of democracy, a democracy without a partnership-based 
engagement of demos. The question is: in such a case are we really still 
talking about democracy?
Earlier, I stressed my conviction about the necessity of the ability to 
form partnerships for the processes of maintaining and/or introducing 
democracy (or similarly: common sets of beliefs, axiological inclusions 
and application of the representation rule). All these abilities, regardless 
of the specific conditions that enable their practicing, should become 
inviolable “equipment” of the entire, politically organized, society, a certain 
“democracy potential” for permanent use, both by “those who govern” and 
“those who are governed”, in reality constituting one demos, even though 
organizationally divided for performing different public roles. Such an 
assertion convinces us that it is worth pointing out to an additional, 
more “community-related” and – as I am convinced – equally important 
characteristic of demos, which – just like the other ones, remains poorly 
recognized by political science, if at all. Its importance for democracy 
comes from the fact that when as a characteristic of demos it disappears, 
the partnership of parties in the relationship of political power becomes 
superficial, we have a certain kind of a propagated “democracy of regime”. 
What I have in mind here is the ability for self-limitation in two different 
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editions: competence on behalf of “those who govern” (institutions of 
political power) and civic on behalf of “those who are governed”. While 
the former means that in the acts of power wielding the only competence 
that is applied is the one that is legally allowed and absolutely necessary 
for an efficient effectiveness in reaching values-goals (ideally earlier 
agreed on by means of a partnership with those to whom these acts 
refer). Simply speaking, “rulers” (an institution holding political power) 
“can” – without trespassing their rights – do much more by adhering to 
these rights which allow them to act (and even with the approval of “those 
who are governed”). Nonetheless, consciously and purposefully they limit 
themselves solely to what is commonly accepted and seen as necessary, 
for getting the results that are expected by demos, nothing more. Hence, 
they can, for example, pass a completely legal tax increase but they do not 
do it, and not because of the potential disapproval from the electorate 
(demos), but because there is a different – less painful for the tax-payers 
and comparably effective – solution to financial problems. “Those who 
govern” could also introduce regulations establishing special consumer 
privileges. But again, the ability to self-limit their competence, can prevent 
them from such a decision. A constant breaching of this rule creates such 
an asymmetry of agency between “those who are governed” and “those who 
govern” that their partnership in carrying out public affairs is no longer 
possible. Naturally, the partnership does not annihilate the asymmetry of 
agency of the parties in power relations. This would be an annihilation 
of power. In democracy, however, this asymmetry should be function-
ally minimalized: to the size allowing (realistically, and not based on the 
principles of some ideology) the implementation of power. Democratic 
rulers, soliciting a partnership with demos, should be driven by the policy 
of minimalizing (“holding horses”) the range of their competence, instead 
of making attempts, usually doomed for failure, of “solving problems” by 
taking on additional competences (increasing their power entitlements).
A civic self-limitation means a deliberate limitation in claiming and 
using one’s civic rights, no matter what their legal or material warranties 
are. This means that the beneficiaries limit the usage of their rights only to 
those whose implementation does not pose a real threat and in a degree 
that is not dangerous for the receiving, protecting and increasing the 
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blessings of the most important public goods (goods that are particularly 
important for the entire politically organised society). The best example 
of such a limitation was the free-will acceptance and as well common 
and spontaneous obedience by the British during the Second World War 
to the limitations of their “civic rights”. The civic self-limitation cannot of 
course permanently deprive the citizens of their rights. It is a “temporary” 
and rather exceptional means of preventing us from losing values that are 
particularly valuable. Its usage makes a citizen (citizens) a partner to all 
others who are in a civic (political) community. The litigations rigour, set 
off by, as Leszek Kołakowski rightly described it: “a never-ending spiral of 
greed” – in societies of “consumption duty” (Kołakowski, 2014, p. 212–213), 
is not favourable to the development of partnership relations in political 
life, meaning it is also not favourable to democratic processes. It could too 
easily legitimize the authoritarian-reforming inclinations of the institu-
tions of political power, depriving demos of this dose of macro-solidarity, 
common solidarity, without which no democracy can succeed. 
If thanks to these reflections we have slightly increased our knowl-
edge about which kind of demos is most pro-democratic, it still remains 
open as to what kind of knowledge can modern political science offer 
in regards to such issues as, for example, the ability of a given society for 
self-limitation or how in this society the adequate awareness and attitudes 
could be shaped? Are we not, paradoxically, in a situation of propagating 
democracy and postulating research on democracy, but without chances 
for improving the necessary knowledge about demos? 
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